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tends that the clandestine nature of both these practices highlight the perva 
siveness of Victorian ideals among the working class and their willingness to self 
enforce them, while underscoring the precarious nature of urban working-class 
single motherhood. A short epilogue closes the book in which Broder makes ex 
plicit connections between the nineteenth century's discourse on welfare and the 
family with America's current political dialogue. 
Ultimately, Broder has written an insightful study which uses sources imag 
inatively to tease out voices in a discourse that have historically been hard to 
hear. Unfortunately, this talent is at times narrowly applied. The intense dis 
course 
analyses on sources like the SPCC's are made at the expense of provid 
ing other sorts of necessary context. Philadelphia as an evolving city and the 
study's backdrop is swiftly dealt with and then set aside leaving many of the sto 
ries she tells to be detached from any real sense of place. Moreover, no thorough 
examination is made of those who funded or ran institutions like the Haven or 
SPCC and for what purposes, although in the case of the Haven this may have 
been for reasons of privacy. More troubling, however, is that these organizations 
are referenced to have ties to municipal institutions like the police, but rarely 
does any sort of local or regional government factor into the study. Nonetheless, 
Broder's analysis of what she does include is both provocative and sound, and 
her insights should be integrated into larger, more contextual studies of urban 
workers and social reform. Historians of poverty, urban welfare, or philanthropy 
will want to be sure to add this book to their personal libraries while scholars of 
urban, labor, or gender history should make a point to give it a careful read. 
Christopher D. Cantwell 
Cornell University 
James D. Rose, Duquesne and the Rise of Steel Unionism. Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2001. xi + 284 pp. $42.50. 
Back to the shop floor! This book is a welcome addition to the literature of Amer 
ican labor in the mid-twentieth century. Through meticulous analysis of steel 
workers at the workplace in Duquesne, Pennsylvania, James D. Rose explains 
the emergence and eventual victory of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 
(SWOC), a part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), in all its com 
plexity. In doing so, he reveals the inadequacy of Lizabeth Cohen's culture of uni 
ty as well as Staughton Lynd's militant alternative unionism to explain the labor 
history of the 1930s. In addition, he reintroduces the idea that the federal gov 
ernment's role in industrial relations was crucial to the success of the CIO. 
Rose uses newly available records of the US Steel-Duquesne Works, espe 
cially its personnel department which included its employee representation plan 
(ERP), records that were discarded by the company when it shut down the 
Works in the 1980s and were rescued by the UE/Labor Archives at the Univer 
sity of Pittsburgh. This has allowed him to enter the little-known world of the 
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ERP. In fact, the ERP, which US Steel had rejected in 1919 when other major 
companies instituted them as a bulwark against unions, was established by the 
company after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 
1933 as an answer to the growing dissatisfaction of its work force and the orga 
nizing activities of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate, the Amal 
gamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers. The book traces the at 
traction of various workers to these two organizations from 1933 to 1935 and 
finds deep divisions at the Duquesne Works. The Great Depression, rather than 
drawing workers together across skill and ethnic lines, exacerbated these divi 
sions. Rose discovered that the ERP attracted skilled and semiskilled tonnage 
workers who worked in groups as well as the traditional skilled tradesmen, all 
of American or Northwestern European backgrounds. The Amalgamated drew 
its strength from the unskilled hourly workers, both foreign-stock (southern 
and eastern-European immigrants and the second generation) and Black. Each 
had specific grievances that were addressed by the respective organizations. The 
tonnage workers found that the ERP dealt rather effectively with their rate 
grievances and safety issues. The Amalgamated's Fort Dukane Lodge attracted 
immigrant and Black workers who bore the brunt of the depression's downturn 
and who responded to the NIRA's apparent support for worker representation. 
They faced layoffs and reduced hours, thus bringing these low-wage workers to 
the brink of destitution. 
The excellent and unique chapter on the ERP reveals the extent to which 
skilled workers used the ERP to press the company for correction of antiquat 
ed wage structures, restraint of the arbitrary power of foremen, and the im 
provement of overall working and safety conditions. Rose claims that the ERP 
leadership evolved from the 1933 company loyalists to more militant represen 
tatives who by 1936 "had developed a sophisticated shop-floor bargaining struc 
ture and grievance procedure."(102) This story, in all its nuance, is well worth 
reading, for it reveals the extent to which ERP militants ultimately tried to build 
a central committee of all US Steel ERPs to deal with the company on a united 
basis. The company management would stand for none of this. Ironically at this 
point in late 1935, with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA 
or Wagner Act) and John L. Lewis's announcement of the formation of the Com 
mittee for Industrial Organization, US Steel began resisting their own ERPs. 
Having effected an agreement with the Amalgamated, Lewis announced 
the formation of SWOC. In January 1937 in hearings before the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), ERP leaders from the Duquesne Works revealed that 
they had joined SWOC as organizers. The following month SWOC established 
a Duquesne local with a coalition of ERP and Amalgamated leaders. But this 
did not signal unity with Amalgamated members at Duquesne, as the rift be 
tween the two groups of workers remained wide. SWOC had to overcome the 
legacy of depressed conditions and the Amalgamated's failures of the NRA 
years. The ERP loyalists, at the same time, were forced as a result of the NLRB 
hearings to choose between the ERP and SWOC. What galvanized both factions 
to unite was the firing of a prominent SWOC leader, and popular SWOC issues 
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were seniority and protection for union members. In time, SWOC built a local 
whose leadership had a strong foreign-stock character, though Black leadership 
declined. Moreover, some ERP loyalists had not been won over and threatened 
to evolve into an independent union. 
When in March 1937, US Steel president Myron Taylor announced he was 
recognizing SWOC as a collective bargaining agent, he refused to recognize 
SWOC as the sole bargaining agent but limited only to its own members. SWOC 
adopted many ERP practices and policies; Taylor even initialed the ERP griev 
ance procedure as part of the SWOC contract. This continued brake on SWOC 
power took its toll as the "Roosevelt recession" of mid-1937 led to lay-offs that 
SWOC could do nothing about. The victory of SWOC leader Elmer Maloy as 
Democratic mayor of Duquesne in the Fall 1937 elections, a victory repeated 
throughout the Monongahela Valley, belied the fact that the local was split along 
political lines, with many tonnage men remaining Republican. The Democratic 
victory was soon undercut by Republicans retaking the City Council the follow 
ing year. 
Chapter 6, which discusses the consolidation of the union in the late 1930s, 
is an important reminder to historians that the CIO barely hung on to its mem 
bership and its contracts in 1938 through 1940. The declining economic condi 
tions, the continued antagonisms among racially and ethnically diverse work 
forces, and the continued resistance of employers might have spelled the end of 
the CIO if the wartime boom had not breathed new life into the economy. Still, 
only the decisions of the National War Labor Board (NWLB) consolidated 
SWOC (and other CIO affiliates) in their roles as sole collective bargaining 
agents for their workers. As Rose notes, SWOC's overwhelming victory in the 
1942 NLRB election at the Duquesne Works obscured the fact that one in four 
eligible voters either did not vote or voted against the union; SWOC continued 
the monthly struggle to collect dues from the rank and file. Here Rose takes on 
those historian detractors of the New Deal who see only bureaucratization in the 
CIO's acquiescence to the federal government's industrial-relations mechanisms 
like dues check-off and maintenance of membership (NWLB contract decisions 
that ordered companies to deduct dues from workers' paychecks and required 
workers to remain members of the union for the duration of the contract if they 
chose to join it). In contrast, he states that these NWLB decisions "artificially 
strengthened an inconsistent and fragmented rank-and-file and masked the in 
ternal weaknesses of the union. 
"(217) 
Finally, Rose argues that only by deeply investigating 1930s unionism in all 
its instabilities and limitations can we begin to appreciate how the labor move 
ment came to its weakened state in the latter part of the twentieth century. Case 
studies such as this still have their place in the study of an era that seems to have 
had its history already settled. All labor historians of the twentieth century will 
want to read this book. 
Cecelia Bucki 
Fairfield University 
